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et al.: Right To Trial By Jury

RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Trial by jury is guaranteed as provided in article one of this
constitution. The legislature nzy provide that in any court of
originaljurisdictiona jury shall be composed of six or of twelve
persons and may authorize any court which shall have
jurisdiction over crimes and other violations of law, other than
crimes prosecuted by indictment, to try such matters without a
jury, provided, however, that crimes prosecuted by indictment
shall be tried by a jury composed of twelve persons, unless a jury
trialhas been waived as provided in section two of article one of
this constitution.
SUPREME COURT
KINGS COUNTY

People v. Sanders 1
(printed April 5, 1994)
The defendant contended that his constitutional right to a trial
by jury, pursuant to the New York State Constitution,2 was
violated when an alternate juror was substituted for a regular
juror after deliberations had begun. The defendant claimed that
his "oral and written consent to the substitution of a juror during
1. N.Y. L.J., Apr. 5, 1994, at 21 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1994).
2. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. Article I, section 2 provides in pertinent part:
Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by
constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever ....A jury trial
may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases... by a written
instrument signed by the defendant in person in open court before and
with the approval of a judge or justice of a court having jurisdiction to
try the offense.
Id.
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deliberations was both ineffective" and constitutionally
impermissible and, subsequently, moved to vacate his murder
conviction. 3 The court found that the defendant "knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily consented to the substitution,"
4
thereby lawfully waiving his constitutional right to a jury trial.
Consequently, the court found no constitutional violation and
5
denied the defendant's action to set aside the conviction.
During the second day of deliberations one juror was unable to
continue with the deliberations. 6 The trial judge gave the
defendant three choices: (1) retain the distraught juror; (2) move
for a mistrial; or (3) continue deliberations with the remaining
eleven jurors. 7 The defendant refused all three options and asked
that an alternate juror, dismissed at the start of deliberations, be
recalled to replace the one who was unable to continue. 8 Despite
the trial judge's warning that the defendant would be bound by
the jury's verdict, and despite the fact that the replacement of the
juror was illegal, the defendant maintained his desire for the
substitution. 9
Prior to the 1966 decision in People v. Ryan, 10 under the old
New York Code of Criminal Procedure, 11 an alternate juror was
not permitted to replace a regular trial juror. 12 The New York
Court of Appeals in Ryan changed this rule. Although it was
permissible to substitute a juror pre-deliberation, postdeliberation substitution amounted to the addition of a thirteenth
3. Sanders, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 5, 1994, at 21.
4. Id.
5. Id.

6. Id.
7. Id.

8. Id.
9. Id. Prior to the defendant's acceptance of the option, the court
"explored fully" the defendant's "understanding and agreement" that he would
be bound by the verdict if he exercised the option. Id.
10. 19 N.Y.2d 100, 224 N.E.2d 710, 278 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1966).

11. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.35 historical note (McKinney
1994); see also Ryan, 19 N.Y.2d at 101-02, 224 N.E.2d at 711, 278 N.Y.S.2d
at 200-01.
12. Ryan, 19 N.Y.2d at 104-05, 224 N.E.2d at 711, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 200-
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juror13 and was, thus, a violation of the defendant's
constitutional right to a trial by a jury of twelve. 14 The court
explained:
The reason that there is no provision for substitution after the
case has been submitted to the jury is that the Advisory
Committee felt that, "[i]t is in only rare situations that the
procedure could be used, and it is believed that an alternate juror
who enters the jury room after deliberation has begun is not fully
qualified to render an intelligent verdict, having missed part of
the discussion and consideration which makes up the deliberative
process." 15
The court of appeals in Ryan indicated that a defendant could
waive the right to trial by jury of twelve and consent to the
substitution of an alternate juror who had been dismissed once
the deliberations had begun, though it did not endorse this course
of action. 16 In this case of first impression, the court of appeals
delineated requirements which must be met in order for a
defendant to validly waive his constitutional right to a jury
trial. 17 Under the New York State Constitution, a defendant
could consent to the substitution of an alternate juror after
deliberations had begun if the waiver was made "by a written
instrument signed by the defendant in person in open court before
and with the approval of a judge or justice of a court having
jurisdiction to try the offense." 1 8 The court wanted to ensure that
the defendant had voluntarily given his informed consent and
waived his constitutional right. 19
13. Id. at 104-05, 224 N.E.2d at 713, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 203.

14. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 n.11. This note states that: "The trial by

jury to which this section has reference is a trial by common law jury of
twelve men." Id.
15. Ryan, 19 N.Y.2d at 104, 224 N.E.2d at 713, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 203
(quoting Second Preliminary Report of Advisory Committee on Practice and
Procedure (N.Y. LEGIS. DOC. 1958 No. 13, at 228)).
16. Id.at 105, 224 N.E.2d at 713, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 203-04.
17. Id.
18. Id.at 104-05, 224 N.E.2d at 712-13, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 202-03. See
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
19. See Ryan, 19 N.Y.2d at 100, 224 N.E.2d at 710, 278 N.Y.S.2d at
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In Ryan, however, the consent was given by the defendant's
counsel, not the defendant himself, and therefore did not satisfy
the constitutional requirement for a waiver. 20 The court found
the substitution of an alternate juror for a regular juror who had
become ill after the jury had deliberated for five hours violated
the defendant's

constitutional

rights because

the defendant

himself was not present nor was he consulted. 2 1 Consent by the
be
insufficient
counsel
was
deemed
to
defendant's
notwithstanding the fact that the defendant's counsel had
22
consented to the substitution.

The common law rule in Ryan was subsequently codified in

23
section 270.35 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure.

It provides that in a criminal case, substitution of an alternate
juror, after the jury has begun it9 deliberations, is a violation of a
defendant's fundamental right to a trial by jury. This right is
protected under the New York Constitution, absent a lawful
waiver by the defendant. Under this statute, a defendant's
20. Id. at 106, 224 N.E.2d at 713, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 204. See People v.
Leon, 28 A.D.2d 912, 282 N.Y.S.2d 301 (2d Dep't 1967) (stating that
reversal was required even though substitution of alternate juror was consented
to be the defense).
21. Ryan, 19 N.Y.2d at 103, 224 N.E.2d at 712, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
22. Id. at 105-06, 224 N.E.2d at 713, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 203-04. See People
v. Sosnicki, 30 A.D.2d 576, 291 N.Y.S.2d 197 (2d Dep't 1968) (holding that
"reversible error was committed when alternate juror substituted for a regular
juror" after deliberations had begun); People v. Leon, 28 A.D.2d 912, 912,
282 N.Y.S.2d 301, 301 (2d Dep't 1967) (concluding that "reversal is also
required by ... People v. Ryan prohibiting the substitution of an alternate
juror after the original jury has begun its deliberation").
23. N.Y. CRim. PRoC. LAW § 270.35 (McKinney 1994). This section
provides in pertinent part:
If at any time after the trial jury has been sworn and before the rendition
of its verdict, a juror is unable to continue serving by reason of illness
or other incapacity... the court must discharge the juror. If an
alternate juror or jurors are available for service, the court must order
that the discharged juror be replaced by the alternate juror whose name
was first drawn and called, provided, however, that if the trial jury has
begun its deliberations, the defendant must consent to such replacement.
Such consent must be in writing and signed by the defendant in person
in open court in the presence of the court.
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consent is required to be written and signed by the defendant
himself in the court.

In People v. Cannady,24 the Supreme Court, Kings County,
held that the "formal procedure" elicited in article I, section 2 of
the New York Constitution, 25 was "designed to ensure that the
defendant's waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently" and "this waiver may not be inferred solely from
the defendant's absence," 2 6 even though the defendant's counsel

consented to the substitution. 27 In other cases, however, courts
have focused upon the defendant's ability to "make a
knowledgeable consent to the substitution after the full
implication" that consent is brought to their attention, 2 8 rather
than the manner in which the consent was given or the waiver
was made. 2 9 In People v. Adamson,3 0 the Supreme Court,

Queens County, held that a stipulation by both parties' counsel
was invalid consent even though the defendant was present in
court. 31 The court reasoned that the mandatory statutory
criteria, 3 2 that the defendant's consent be made in writing and
"accepted after the trial judge determined whether such waiver

was knowingly and intelligently made," 3 3 was necessary "to
demonstrate that there has been a considered consent after
24. 127 Misc. 2d 783, 487 N.Y.S.2d 294 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1985).
25. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.
26. Cannady, 127 Misc. 2d at 783, 785, 487 N.Y.S.2d 294, 297.
27. See People v. Adamson, 108 Misc. 2d 394, 437 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1981) (finding that a stipulation by defense counsel did not
satisfy the constitutional requirements for waiver).
28. Id. at 399, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 616. See People v. Donovan, 136 Misc.
2d 47, 50, 517 N.Y.S.2d 657, 658 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1987) (upholding
the defendant's conviction even though he refused to consent to the substitution
because deliberations had just begun).
29. See People v. Page, 153 Misc. 2d 870, 583 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1992) (holding that the fact that the defendant did not give a
written waiver did not invalidate his consent to substitution or warrant reversal
of conviction), at'd,619 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1994).
30. 108 Misc. 2d 394, 400, 437 N.Y.S.2d 613, 617 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1981).
31. Id.
32. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LANV § 270.35 (McKinney 1994).
33. Adamson, 108 Misc. 2d at 400, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
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defendant's constitutional rights had been fully explained and
34
understood."The Supreme Court, Bronx County, has subsequently
questioned the wisdom of the prescribed guidelines elicited in
35
section 270.35 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure,
finding that "[t]he linchpin of the 1966 Ryan ruling... no
longer exists." ' 36 The court reasoned that the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure, 37 which were relied upon in the court of
appeals' decision in Ryan, 38 no longer required a defendant's
consent to the substitution of an alternate juror after submission
of the case for deliberation. 3 9 In People v. Donovan,4 0 the court
relied on the Second Circuit's decision in United States v.
Hillard41 which found no violation of the United States
Constitution 4 2 by the lack of defendant's consent to the

substitution 43 and "specifically rejected the argument that a
subsequent verdict would have been rendered by a thirteen-man
jury."44

The

court

circumstances of the

consequently

case, 45

held

that

under

the

where the jury had barely begun to

' 47
deliberate and deliberations were ordered "to begin anew,
there was "no violation of the common-law twelve man jury
46

34. Id. See People v. Barnes, 58 A.D.2d 608, 608, 395 N.Y.S.2d 232,
232 (2d Dep't 1977) (holding that "substitution without appellant's consent and
over his objection of an alternate juror after deliberations had commenced was
prejudicial error").
35. N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 270.35 (McKinney 1994).
36. People v. Donovan, 136 Misc. 2d 47, 50, 517 N.Y.S.2d 657, 658
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1987)
37. Id. at 50, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 658-59.
38. Ryan, 19 N.Y.2d at 104, 224 N.E.2d at 712, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
"The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that alternate jurors must
be discharged after the case is submitted to the jury." Id.
39. Donovan, 136 Misc. 2d at 50, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 658-59.
40. 136 Misc. 2d 47, 517 N.Y.S.2d 657 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1987)
41. 701 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1057.
45. Donovan, 136 Misc. 2d at 51-52, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 659-60.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 51, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
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constitutionally mandated, 48 no verdict having been rendered,
and deliberations... having been minimal at most." 49
In the 1992 decision People v. Page,50 the Supreme Court,
New York County, emphasized the objectives of the
constitutional and statutory provisions over the statutory
requirements. The court distinguished the case from Ryan and its

progeny, 51 rejecting the defendant's claim that because his
consent to the substitution was not given in writing, his
conviction should be set aside. 52 In coming to its conclusion, the

court reasoned that "[i]n actuality, the writing requirement for
consent to seat the alternate exists to insure that defendant's
consent is 'knowing, voluntary and intelligent.' ' 53 Moreover,
while the defendant's consent was not given in writing, in the
precedent cases upon which the defendant relied, the consent was
given by the defendant's counsel and not by the defendant
himself. 54 Therefore, the court held that while the defendant's

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 153 Misc. 2d 870, 583 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1992).
51. See People v. Sosnicki, 30 A.D.2d 576, 291 N.Y.S. 2d 197 (2d Dep't
1968) (holding that the substitution of an alternate juror after deliberations
began violated defendant's constitutional right to a trial by jury); People v.
Leon, 28 A.D.2d 912, 282 N.Y.S.2d 301 (2d Dep't 1967) (finding that
defense counsel's consent ineffective where substitution of an alternate juror
was made after the jury began deliberating); People v. Cannady, 127 Misc. 2d
783, 487 N.Y.S.2d 294 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1985) (explaining that the
defendant's absence precluded a lawful substitution of an alternate juror
notwithstanding defense counsel's consent), aft'd, 138 A.D.2d 616, 526
N.Y.S.2d 202 (2d Dep't 1988); People v. Adamson, 108 Misc. 2d 394, 437
N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1981) (holding that the substitution of
alternate juror, absent the constitutional requirements of defendant's consent in
writing and in open court violated his constitutional right to a trial by jury).
52. Page, 153 Misc. 2d at 871, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 141.
53. Id. at 871, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
54. Id. at 872, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 142. See Leon, 28 A.D.2d 912, 282
N.Y.S.2d 301 (finding reversal required by substitution of a juror after
deliberations had begun); Adamson, 108 Misc. 2d 394, 437 N.Y.S.2d 613
(holding that despite the fact that defendant was present, stipulation by
defendant's counsel did not constitute a valid waiver).
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consent did not meet the statutory directives, 55 his waiver
satisfied the statutory and constitutional objectives because the
defendant was directly involved and the court had "sought the
56
defendant's view personally."
In applying the statutory and constitutional mandates in
Sanders, the court found no "constitutional infirmity in the
procedure followed. ' 57 Here, the defendant's consent was given
orally and in writing, with the court's full inquiry into the
defendant's options and the implications of such a waiver with
both the defendant and his counsel. 58 The defendant's consent
was, therefore, found to have been "knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily" given and the waiver valid. 59 Accordingly, where
"the defendant executed such a statutory waiver and stated
unequivocally his understanding both of his options and the
implications of his decision," the court found no constitutional
violation as a result of the substitution and thereby denied the
defendant's motion to vacate his murder conviction. 60

55. N.Y. CRm. PROC. LAw § 270.35.
56. Page, 153 Misc. 2d at 872, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
57. Sanders, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 5, 1994, at 12.
58. Id.
59. Id. The court found the waiver valid notwithstanding defense counsel's
advice that the procedures taken in this case may have been unlawful. Id.
60. Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/61

8

